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7  Debt Crisis and Adjustment 
The Philippines went through a particularly wrenching adjustment process in 
the three years following the declaration of a moratorium in October  1983. 
This  adjustment  episode  is  interesting  for  a  number  of  reasons.  The 
Philippines  had  waited  until  its  foreign  exchange  reserves  were  almost 
exhausted  before  declaring  a  moratorium  and  had  very  little  room  for 
maneuver  once foreign credit was cut off.  Second, the Philippines resisted 
adjustment policies insisted upon by the IMF, taking over a year to reach a 
standby  agreement and nineteen months  to reach a rescheduling  agreement 
with its creditor banks. Third, the program that the Philippines followed was 
strikingly successful in achieving adjustment, eliminating the current account 
deficit  and  domestic  inflation  by  1986.  Finally,  much  of  the  discussion 
between  the Philippines and the IMF were reported  in the Philippine press, 
giving a unique insight into the negotiation  over adjustment programs. 
The crisis and adjustment period  may be  divided  into three  phases.  The 
first,  from  the  declaration  of  the  moratorium  to  mid-1984  is  the  initial 
reaction  phase.  During  this  period  the  Philippines  was  not  under  an  IMF 
program,  although  negotiations  with  the  Fund  continued  for  a  standby 
program for 1984 and the Fund did influence  some of the policy  measures 
that  the  Philippines  adopted.  The second  phase  of  the  adjustment  process 
was  characterized  by  a  stringent  IMF adjustment  program.  Although  the 
program  was signed in December, there were prior conditions that affected 
Philippine action  in  the  last  half  of  1984. This second phase ran  until  the 
presidential  election  in  February  1986.  The  last  phase  started  with  the 
negotiation  of the nineteenth  standby agreement between  the Fund and the 
new Aquino government. 
The adjustment phases are determined by the presence or absence of IMF 
adjustment  programs,  and  with  good  reason.  During  these  years  the 
relationship between the Fund and the Philippine government changed twice, 
and sharply  in both instances.  The Philippines had  a relatively  lenient IMF 
program in 1980-81,  in which it exceeded targets on domestic credit and net 
international  reserves  by  a  wide  margin.  The relationship  with  the  Fund 
began to change in 1982. The unilateral increase in the size of the Philippine 
industrial  rescue  fund  led  the  IMF  to  reject  a  program  for  1982.  The 
seventeenth standby arrangement, which became effective in February  1983, 
had more restrictive limits on domestic credit and government contributions 
to public corporations,  as well  as a limit on short-term nonmonetary  debt. 
However,  the Philippines rapidly and substantially exceeded the ceilings on 
domestic  credit  and  the  target  for the  balance  of  payments, and  the  IMF 
terminated  the  agreement  in  the  summer of  1983 after only  two  of  the 
program’s  four tranches had been drawn (IMF 1984a, 8, 12). 
Thus  the  Philippines  declared  its  moratorium  during  one  of  the  rare 
periods  in which the  country  was  not under  an IMF standby arrangement. 525  Philippines/Chapter  7 
During  the  early  crisis  period  the  Philippines reversed  course  on  policy 
reforms it had undertaken through IMF and World Bank programs in favor of 
policies  that  were  familiar,  could  be  implemented  rapidly,  and  were 
addressed to the critical foreign exchange constraint. 
7.1  Trade and Exchange Rate Policy 
At  the time that the Philippines suspended payments,  foreign exchange 
reserves were  extremely low,  and  the  first  task  of  policy  was  to  try  to 
manage  international transactions  with  a  minimal  level  of  liquidity. The 
Philippines almost immediately instituted a  foreign exchange control and 
allocation system. Banks were required to surrender their foreign exchange 
receipts to a pool  at the central bank,  from which the central bank  made 
allocations for critical imports. The central bank established an allocation 
system that gave priority to crude oil imports, raw materials and supplies for 
export  industries,  grain  imports,  raw  materials for  certain  vital  domestic 
industries, and debt servicing for loans from multilateral organizations. 
The exchange policy  allowed certain  imports to  take place outside the 
allocation system. Exporters could import materials on consignment as long 
as no external financing was required. Firms that were subsidiaries or joint 
ventures of  foreign firms were allowed to pay for raw  material imports with 
equity. In  addition, the allocation system allowed imports of  goods not on 
the priority list on a “no dollar”  basis, if  the importer could come up with 
the necessary exchange independently. This in fact created a dual exchange 
rate system, where importers receiving allocations purchased at the official 
rate, while others financed their imports through the black market at higher 
rates (table 7.1). It also weakened the exchange surrender system, and by 
mid-1984 the central bank estimated that it only received about 60 percent of 
the country’s foreign exchange receipts. 
The Philippines had a dual exchange rate system in a more organized and 
unusual sense. Faced with a black market exchange rate of almost P.  30 per 
dollar (versus an official rate of P.  14), the Marcos government intervened to 
oligopolistically  organize  the  foreign  exchange  black  market  in  the 
Philippines. In  the  words  of  the Minister of  Trade and  Industry, Roberto 
Ongpin, who was responsible for the operation: 
the largest and best known Chinese black marketeers were rounded up by 
the National Intelligence and Security Authority and were told that it was 
the government’s intention to organize a currency stabilization program. 
The Chinese black  marketeers would be  permitted  to keep their profits 
from their operations provided that they cooperated with the government 
by  buying and selling foreign exchange at government-dictated rates. . . . 
In order to maintain discipline, the participants were subject to arrest if 
they deviated from the established rates. (Ongpin 1986) 526  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 7.1  Official and  Black Market Exchange Rates (pesos per dollar and  ratio) 
Official  Black  Official  Black 
Exchange  Market  Exchange  Market 










































































































































19.042  0.953 
20.461  0.945 
20.781  1.047 
20.505  1.073 
20.500  1.073 
20.552  I .039 
20.454  1.015 
20.432  0.997 
20.509  0.995 
20.437  0.999 
20.436  0.997 
20.491  0.995 
20.504  0.995 
20.525  0.994 
20.563  0.992 
20.505  0.982 
20.473  0.983 
20.456  0.978 
20.450  0.978 
20.439  0.984 
20.601  0.985 
20.706  0.984 
20.817  0.998 
20.815  0.967 
- 
aHong Kong banknote rate divided by the official exchange rate. 
This operation was termed  the  "Binondo  Central  Bank,"  named for the 
area in Manila where most of  the black  market currency trading was done, 
and existed from early  1984 until February  1986. Exchange rate guidelines 
were  set by  Ongpin, and officers of  the  National  Intelligence  and Security 527  PhilippineKhapter 7 
Authority  accompanied  shipments  of  currency  to  Hong  Kong.  The 
organization of  the black  market  helped  the  Philippines narrow  the black 
market premium on the exchange rate in  early  1984 and also helped meet 
IMF conditions later in the year. 
To  support  the  exchange  rate  allocation  system,  the  government  also 
halted the program of import liberalization that had been adopted as a part of 
the World Bank's structural adjustment loans, and instead imposed additional 
import  restrictions.  Taxes  on  international trade  were  increased,  both  to 
discourage imports and to raise government revenue. An additional 3 percent 
surtax  had  been  levied  on  all  imports  in  January  1983. The  government 
raised this surtax to 5 percent in November, later to 8 percent, and then to 10 
percent in June 1984. The Philippines also raised taxes on exports of primary 
commodities to levels that ranged from 6 to 10 percent.' 
The Philippines had  pursued  a passive exchange rate  policy  during the 
1980s. The real  exchange rate of  the peso remained almost constant with 
respect to the U.S.  dollar, as gradual depreciation offset a higher domestic 
inflation rate.  But  the  real  effective exchange  rate  moved  with  the  U.S. 
currency and followed the dollar up in the early 1980s, so that by  1982 it had 
risen  15 percent from its  1978 level. There were two devaluations in 1983, 
one in June from P.  10.2 to P.  11 per dollar, and a second in October to P.  14. 
This last devaluation resulted  in a real  effective depreciation of  about  21 
percent from the December 1982 level. The effective exchange rate change 
for traditional exports was somewhat less because of  the increase in export 
taxes. For import commodities not on the priority list the real depreciation was 
huge; not only were there surcharges on imported commodities, but currency 
had to be sourced through the black market (table 7.2 and fig. 7.1). 
Table 7.2  Real Effective Exchange Rates 
Dec 82  June 83  Dec 83  June 84  Dec 84  June 85  Dec 85  June 86 
Official exchange 
Philippine CPI  177.6  184.4  223.9  275.2  337.7  351.3  356.8  351.4 
Partners WPI  ($)  124.39  124.80  124.76  124.71  123.90  123.08  130.46  137.84 
Black market 
Import tariffs  1.31  1.32  1.34  1.39  I .39  1.34  1.34  1.34 
Traditional 
export taxes'  0.960  0.960  0.943  0.879  0.943  0.943  0.943  0.943 
Nontraditional 
export taxes  0.997  0.997  0.996  0.996  0.996  0.996  0.996  0.996 
Traditional 
exports  100.0  115.9  119.3  116.4  110.9  98.9  106.4  123.5 
Nontraditional 
exports  100.0  115.9  121.3  126.9  112.8  100.6  108.2  125.6 
Importables  100.0  115.1  162.1  155.6  113.9  97.8  102.9  127.4 
rate  9.171  11.002  14.002  18.002  19.760  18.465  19.032  20.580 
premium  1.035  1.020  1.350  1.195  0.984  0.983  0.961  1.026 
~  ~~~ 
Source  Lamberte et al  (1985). table IV 3, updated by the authors 
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Fig. 7.1  Real effective exchange rates (December 1982 = 100) 
Note: M  = importables; Xnt  = nontraditional exports; and Xtr = traditional exports. 
7.2  Government Budget 
In  1981 and 1982 the consolidated public sector budget deficit reached 5.5 
percent of GNP, with the deficit of the national government over 4 percent of 
GNP. This marked the peak of  Philippine budget deficits, and the following 
year saw a significant narrowing of the deficit of the public sector. 
Revenues were increased by  the import surcharge, the additional taxes on 
exports,  and increased excise taxes on petroleum  and other products. The 
result was a rise in the revenue share of  GNP to 12.0 percent in  1983 from 
1  1.4 percent in 1982. National government expenditures fell by  8 percent in 
real terms during 1983. Nonwage, noninterest expenditures (primarily oper- 
ations and  maintenance expenditures) were reduced by  13 percent in  real 
terms, and the capital expenditure of the national government was trimmed. 
But  the biggest decline came in equity transfers and net lending to govern- 
ment  corporations,  which  fell  from  3.5  percent  of  GNP  in  1982 to  2.1 
percent  in  1983. As  a result of  these expenditure cuts  and  the  increased 
revenue effort, the deficit of  the national  government fell  to 2  percent of 
GNP for 1983. 529  Philippines/Chapter  7 
The  deficits  of  the  public  corporations were  more  difficult  to  control. 
Despite the deferral of  five of  the Major Industrial Projects during the year, 
investment expenditures by public corporations stayed at 5 percent of  GNP, 
even  as  the  national  government was  reducing its  contributions to  public 
enterprises.  Part  of  the  resulting  financing  requirement was  met  through 
internal funds. Cash generation of  the public corporations rose during the 
year  because  of  higher charges  on  public  services,  but  also  because the 
National  Power Corporation ran  up  external arrears toward  the end of  the 
year.  However,  the  borrowing  requirement of  the  public  corporate  sector 
remained  at  2.1  percent  of  GNP.  Almost  the  entire  deficit  was  financed 
through foreign borrowing.2 
Only at the end of  the  year did  the Finance Ministry exert more direct 
control over the operations of  the nonfinancial corporate sector. Tariffs and 
taxes were raised on water, power, petroleum products, and transportation, 
and the investment programs of the corporations were substantially reduced. 
In  addition,  the  government  imposed  more  effective  ceilings  on  foreign 
borrowing by  corporations, including short-term borrowing. 
7.3  Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy also became more restrictive at the end of  1982, and this 
continued through the first half of  1983. Reserve money in June  1983 was 
only  2  percent  higher than  it  had  been  in  June  1982.3 During  1983 the 
central bank took further actions to limit the growth of reserve money and to 
reduce  the  money  multiplier.  The  Philippines  completed  its  financial 
liberalization in January 1983 when the last limits on short-term interest rates 
were  removed.  At  the  same time,  the  central  bank  announced  limits on 
drawings from the subsidized rediscount windows and for the first time tied 
the  rates of  those rediscounts to  market  interest rates.4 The central bank 
raised reserve requirements from 18 to 23 percent during the last half of the 
year, reversing the decline in reserve requirements that had taken place under 
the financial liberalization program. 
Despite these efforts, there was massive growth in the monetary base in 
the last half  of  1983. From June to December of  that year reserve money 
increased by 72 percent to a level of P.  28 billion (table 7.3). The increase in 
reserve requirements and greater public  holding of currency restrained the 
growth of  the money supply, but MI  still increased by  40  percent over the 
course of  1983. As  a result of  this  explosion in money,  the central bank 
largely  accommodated the  devaluations  that  took  place  during  1983.  In 
December market interest rates were only two percentage points over their 
June levels and inflation was running at 50 percent. 
Four factors accounted for the rise in reserve money over the latter part of 
1983.  The  first  was  an  increase  in  central  bank  credit  to  the  national Table 7.3  Factors Affecting Reserve Money'  (in billions of pesos) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Dec  Mar  Jun  Sept  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sept  Dec  Jun  Dec  Mar  Jun  Dec 
Reserve money 
Net foreign assets 
Net domestic assets 
Credit to public sector 
National government 
Assistance to financial institutions 
Regular rediscounting 
CB securities, RPs, RRPs 
Other items net 
Swap differential 
Forward cover differential 
18.6  17.2  16.1  17.6  27.7 
-35.5  -37.4  -45.1  -52.9  -44.1 
54.1  54.6  61.2  70.5  72.4 
8.0  8.0  8.3  9.6  12.5 
9.9  9.7  9.0  9.5  12.0 
3.1  3.5  3.0  2.7  5.0 
15.9  15.8  13.1  12.1  12.2 
-4.6  -4.7  -4.7  -4.4  -4.4 
31.7  32.0  41.5  50.5  47.1 
1.2  1.7  2.6  3.5  8.0 
























































38.0  40.4 
-80.1  -81.1 
118.1  121.5 
20.9  28.1 
16.3  23.6 
13.7  19.1 
8.3  9.0 
-32.2  -49.5 
107.4  114.8 
14.2  14.2 






















-  29.9 
Source:  IMF (1984b;  1985c;  1986b;  1988b). 
Note:  RPs are repurchase agreements and RRPs are reverse repurchase agreements. 
"Monetary authorities basisincludes Treasury IMF accounts. Foreign assets and liabilities converted into pesos at constant exchange rate of  P.  18.002 per U.S. dollar 531  PhilippineKhapter 7 
government, which rose by  3 billion pesos (45 percent of  the government’s 
annual  deficit).  The  other  sources  of  monetary  expansion  were  less 
conventional. The largest increase in  reserve money came from the losses 
incurred  on  outstanding  swap  and  forward  cover  contracts  when  the 
exchange  rate  depreciated. These  losses  added  P.  8  billion  to  domestic 
assets, equivalent to two-thirds of the increase in reserve money, although a 
substantial portion of  these losses was blocked to their recipients by  the 
central  bank.  Additional  growth  in  reserve  money  came  from  the 
accumulation of external payments arrears. The buildup of arrears blunted 
the contractionary effect of  reserves outflow, and this was not offset by  the 
collection of peso deposits on amounts in arrears. 
The external crisis weakened confidence in  the already fragile financial 
system of  the Philippines, particularly in nonbank financial institutions. The 
central bank expanded emergency loans to financial institutions by  2 billion 
pesos during the last half of  1983, most of  it to thrift banks, which added to 
the growth of reserve money during the last part of  the year. 
7.4  Domestic Inflation and Price Intervention Policy 
The domestic inflation rate accelerated dramatically during the last half of 
1983, fueled  by  devaluation,  the  institution  of  import  controls,  money 
supply growth,  and  consumer hoarding of  commodities such  as rice and 
cooking oil. By the beginning of  1984 consumer prices were rising at a rate 
of 60 percent per year, and this rate persisted throughout 1984 (fig. 7.2). The 
Philippine government had set domestic price ceilings for rice, sugar, and a 
number of  other consumer commodities since the beginning of  the martial 
law peri~d.~  In addition, the government regulated prices for transportation 
and  domestic sales of  petroleum products.6 These prices were adjusted at 
frequent  intervals after June  1983 to  reflect  higher  import  and  domestic 
costs,  but  the  discrete  nature  of  the  price  ceiling  adjustments  led  to 
anticipatory buying and shortages of consumer items during 1983 and 1984, 
and an acceleration of the consumer price index at the time each adjustment 
was made. 
Philippine actions in the initial crisis period increased the difficulty that 
the country had  in adjusting to  the cutoff of  foreign funds. The very low 
level of  foreign exchange reserves available to the country dominated initial 
policy,  leading  to  exchange  and  tax  policies  that  discriminated against 
exports.  The  government  had  difficulty  reducing  the  deficit  due  to  its 
ineffective control over public corporations. But the loss of control over the 
money supply in the last half of  1983 was the most damaging. The effect of 
the  1983  devaluation  was  lost  through  price  level  increases,  and  by 
mid-1984 inflation was proceeding at Latin American rates. 532  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
7.5  An IMF Standby Agreement 
7.5.1  Negotiations 
Negotiations between the Philippines and the International Monetary Fund 
for a new standby to replace the cancelled  1983 agreement were disrupted by 
the  Aquino  assassination  in  August,  but  resumed  in  September.  Events 
moved rapidly  in  October. A devaluation  was one of  the conditions  of  the 
Fund  which  the  Philippines  carried  out on October 5. On October  17 the 
Philippines  declared  a  moratorium  on principal  repayments on its external 
debt, and a ten-bank advisory group was formed, headed by Manufacturer's 
Hanover.  On November  10 the Philippines submitted a letter of intent to the 
IMF. The program  contained in  the  letter  of  intent  was  approved  by  the 
Fund's  managing  director  and  sent  to  the  Fund's  executive  board  for 
approval.  Unable  to  rush  the  approval  process  forward,  the  Philippines 
applied to the United  States for a bridge  loan until  disbursements from the 
IMF  program  came through, but  the  U.S. demurred,  insisting  that  it  too 
would wait for the executive board's approval. 533  PhilippineKhapter 7 
The IMF program and the rescheduling negotiations were derailed by the 
discovery in early December of the Philippine reserves overstatement.  The 
banks broke off negotiations on rescheduling,  and the IMF immediately sent 
a team  to  Manila  to examine  the  books  of  the  central  bank,  shelving  the 
agreement  that  had  been  reached.  While  the  practice  of  padding  reserve 
figures  was  not  unusual  among  LDCs,  it  had  a  devastating  effect  on the 
relations  between  the  Philippines  and  both  the  IMF  and  the  country’s 
creditor banks. 
The amounts  involved were  large; the overstatement  had  run as high  as 
$1.1 billion, or SO percent of stated international reserves. But the effect was 
far  greater,  because  it  cast  doubt  on  the  integrity  and  honesty  of  the 
Philippine  technocrats,  a  group  that  the  IMF  had  considered  allies  in 
promoting  policy reforms  in the  Philippines.  Jaime  Laya, the central bank 
governor,  was  most  directly  affected,  but  the  reputations  of  all  of  the 
technocrats were tarnished,  with the possible exception of Cesar Virata, the 
finance  minister.  Negotiations  became  much  more  testy,  and nearly  every 
factual  submission by  Philippine  negotiators  was  subject to question.  The 
IMF insisted on an outside audit of the books of the central bank which was 
performed by Sycip, Gorres, and Velayo, a large, local accounting firm. The 
IMF and  the  World  Bank  sent  teams  during  1984 to  examine  Philippine 
economic statistics. The negotiating banks informed Finance Minister Virata 
that they would rather not see Governor Laya at the table when negotiations 
resumed.  Laya was appointed minister of education, culture, and  sports in 
January,  and  Jose  Fernandez,  head  of  the  Far  East  Bank,  was  appointed 
governor of the central bank. 
The  negotiations  on  a  new  standby  agreement  were  prolonged  and 
difficult,  and it was not until December  1984 that a new agreement with the 
IMF was signed. During that time the Philippines had to extend the original 
ninety-day  moratorium several times since agreement with the banks hinged 
on an agreement with the Fund. Reaching an agreement with the IMF was a 
critical  matter.  The Philippines  had  to deal  with  an  extreme  shortage of 
foreign exchange after the moratorium was declared. Reserves were low, and 
the centralization of foreign exchange receipts that the central bank had tried 
to establish  was  not  very  successful.  The dollar pool  that the central bank 
created had  a balance of only $800 million in the first week  of  January, of 
which $455 million was earmarked for oil imports. Even importers of goods 
on the priority  list were having trouble getting allocations from the central 
bank.  As  the  negotiations  with  the  Fund  wore  on, the  Philippines  finally 
arranged  additional  financing  from  other sources:  the U.S. Export Import 
Bank and the Commodity Credit Corporation provided additional funds early 
in 1984, as did the Asian Development Bank. In all, the Philippines was able 
to raise $370 million from these agencies. 
This time  the  IMF took  a  much  tougher  stand  than  it  had  in  previous 
standby consultations. Negotiations took place not only on the content of  the 534  Robert S.  Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
program, but also on the prior actions that the Philippines would have to take 
before  the  IMF  would  agree  to  a  program.  What  the  Fund  particularly 
wanted was a reduction in the money supply after the huge increase of  the 
last part of  1983. At  this time the inflation rate was already running at 60 
percent per year, and the Fund worried that the Philippines would develop a 
high  inflation-devaluation  cycle  similar to  that  of  many  Latin  American 
countries. The IMF originally set as a target a reduction of  reserve money 
from P.  28 billion at the end of  December 1983 to P.  23 billion by the end of 
March.’ 
The central bank  had  some success in  reducing liquidity through  open 
market operations in the first quarter of  1984, although some of the reduction 
was  seasonal.  Outstanding central bank  securities and  reverse  repurchase 
agreements increased by  P.  6.5 billion during the quarter  (see table 7.3). 
However, parliamentary elections were held on May  14, and advances to the 
government, largely used  to finance the election,  increased sharply in  the 
second quarter, reversing the gains the central bank had previously made. 
The central bank also increased its emergency loans to financial institutions 
during the quarter. 
The fragility of the financial system was an obstacle to liquidity reduction 
during much of  the year. The system had been battered by  the Dewey Dee 
crisis  in  1981  and  by  the  prolonged  domestic  recession.  When  reserve 
requirements were raised by  five percentage points in the last half of  1983, 
reserve deficiencies rose to over 20 percent of  required reserves. Half of the 
reserve deficiencies were those of the government-owned PNB. These were 
erased  early  in  1984  when  the  central  bank  allowed  PNB  to  exchange 
uncollectible promissory notes issued by  sugar mills for bonds issued by the 
newly  created  Philippine Sugar Corporation,  and  then  made  those bonds 
eligible as reserves. 
The  central bank  had  made  large emergency loans  to  thrift banks  and 
investment houses during the last part of  1983. In 1984 emergency loans and 
overdrafts to commercial banks and DBP increased sharply (table 7.4). In 
July, a run on the Banco Filipino, the country’s largest savings bank, forced 
the bank  to close its doors.’  At  this  point the central bank  had extended 
almost one billion pesos to Banco Filipino. The central bank at first refused 
to supply additional emergency assistance but, after a presidential directive, 
extended an additional P.  3 billion to the savings bank. In negotiations with 
the IMF, Virata and Fernandez argued that further reductions in the money 
supply would create more extreme difficulties in the financial system. 
There were other issues that were important in the negotiations on prior 
action for a standby program. The Fund wanted a further devaluation of the 
peso to restore the erosion of  real exchange rates that had taken place since 
the previous devaluation, and  a floating of  the exchange rate to allow the 
resumption of bank foreign exchange trading and the narrowing of the black 
market  premium.  The  Fund  also  wanted  further  cuts  in  the  investment 535  PhilippineKhapter 7 
Table 7.4  Central Bank Emergency Loans to Financial Institutions (in millions of pesos) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  I986 
Dee  Jun  Dec  Jun  Dec  Mar  Dec  Mar  Sept 
- 
Emergency loans  3,137  3,051  3.787  3,432  3,732  3,950  3,996  3.961  3,874 
Commercial banks  3,074  2,989  2,753  1,397  1,565  1,839  1,942  1,919  1,871 
Thrift banks  25  25  226  234  358  285  248  245  236 
Financecompanies  32  28  205  283  288  306  302  297  306 
Investment houses  -  -  396  499  497  497  486  482  443 
9  7  7  12  11  6  6  6  Rural banks  - 
Special government 
banks  6-  200  1,012  1.012  1,012  1,012  1,012  1,012 
Overdrafts  2  2  1,170  3,219  7,189  8,255  9.752  15,181  9,960 
Commercial banks  2  2  487  2,524  3,444  4,416  6,009  11,443  6.247 
Thrift banks  -  -  252  480  3,530  3,625  3,530  3,525  3,500 
Finance companies  -  -  29  9  9  8  8  8  8 
Investment houses  -  -  402  206  206  206  205  205  205 
Total  3,139  3,053  4,957  6,651  10,921  12,205  13,748  19,142  13,834 
____ 
Source  IMF (1985~).  table 47, and the central bank, Quarterly Economic and Financia[ Report. September  1986. 
programs  of  the  state-owned  corporations,  an  increase  in  taxes,  and  a 
shifting of  tax burdens away from international trade and toward domestic 
transactions. 
On June 5 the central bank devalued the peso to a level of P.  18 per dollar, 
and at the same time instituted two additional trade taxes. The first was a 10 
percent  tax  on  foreign  exchange  for  nonmerchandise  transactions.  The 
second  was  a  windfall  tax  on  traditional exports,  called  the  economic 
stabilization tax.’  The effect of  the two taxes was to establish a multiple 
exchange rate system. Nontraditional exports and merchandise imports for 
which exchange was allocated took place at P.  18 per dollar, nonmerchandise 
imports at P.  19.80 per dollar, and traditional exports at an effective rate of 
P.  16.80. These additional measures became further sources of disagreement 
between  the  IMF and  the  Philippines, and  their removal became  a prior 
condition of the agreement. 
In September and October 1984 the Philippines took a number of  actions 
that paved the way for an eventual agreement with the Fund. The economic 
stabilization tax on exports, imposed along with the June devaluation, was 
removed on  September 22.  In  September the  central bank  also  allowed 
commercial banks to retain half of  their foreign exchange receipts, and the 
exchange allocation system was abolished in October. The import surcharge 
was reduced to 5 percent, and the 10 percent excise tax on foreign exchange 
for nonmerchandise imports was replaced by  a uniform 1 percent tax on all 
foreign exchange transactions. Finally, on October 15 the exchange rate was 
allowed to float. 
In  August  and  October the  Philippine  government  increased taxes  on 
petroleum products and crude oil, coke and coal, and other products subject 536  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
to excise taxes. Interest exemptions were removed and, in a major victory 
for the  Fund,  the  Philippine government agreed  to  remove tax  and  tariff 
exemptions from  government-owned corporations  and  to  reduce  the  tax 
exemptions  given  to  manufacturing  firms  under  BOI  incentives.  The 
estimated impact of these measures on the 1984 budget was P.  2.6 billion, or 
0.5 percent of  GNP. 
In March the Monetary  Board  gave the central bank  permission to sell 
short-term,  non-reserve-eligible  notes.  The  central  bank  aggressively 
marketed these bills, called “Jobo  bills”  after the nickname of the central 
bank governor, starting in  mid-August, at rates that exceeded 40 percent. 
Job0 bills were purchased by  banks as a safe alternative to domestic loans 
and by  the nonbank public. Through the sale of these securities, the central 
bank  succeeded in  reducing  reserve  money  by  approximately  12 percent 
between  early  August  and  the  end  of  October,  clearing  the  way  for  an 
agreement with the Fund. A letter of  intent was submitted October 3 1, and 
the standby arrangement was approved by the executive board of the IMF on 
14 December 1984. 
7.5.2  The Adjustment Program 
The  standby  arrangement worked  out  with  the  IMF was  exceptionally 
stringent. The agreement was for $650 million, spread over eighteen months 
and divided into seven tranches. Program reviews were set for each quarter, 
and some of the conditions covering the remainder of the program were to be 
set at later reviews. The IMF agreement cleared the way  for rescheduling 
agreements with  the commercial banks and with official creditors, but  the 
program itself brought little additional funding. The initial drawings under 
the agreement were to be used to clear up arrears that the Philippines had 
accumulated. 
The program and the assumptions on which  it was based are outlined in 
tables 7.5 and  7.6.  The most  immediate indication of  the severity of  the 
adjustment program is given by the GNP assumptions. The expected drop in 
GNP for 1984 was 6 percent, with zero growth assumed in  1985, implying a 
fall in per capita income of  11 percent over two years. In fact, these turned 
out to be too optimistic; real output fell in both years, leading to a 15 percent 
reduction in  per capita income from 1983 to 1985. 
The monetary targets proved to be the most difficult to meet. The targeted 
measure  was  reserve money,  currency  plus  bank  reserves. lo The  reserve 
money figure had  already reached a peak of  P.  34 billion by  early August 
1984, and the December 1984 ceiling required a substantial reduction. The 
growth of  reserve money was to be limited to 23 percent over the course of 
1985. The monetary targets also included substantial reductions in banking 
system  credit  to  the  public  sector, ruling  out  monetary  financing  of  the 
government deficit during 1985. Table 7.5  Philippines 1985-86  Standby Program Rrforrnance Criteria 
31 December  1984  31 March  1985  31 December  1985  31 March  1986 
Ceiling  Actual  Ceiling  Actual  Ceiling  Actual  Ceiling  Actual 
Money and credit (billion pesos) 
Reserve money 
Net banking system credit to 
Bank credit to public sector 
Central hank credit to PNB 
External payments (million US$) 
Net international reserves (Boor) 
External payments arrears 
Short-term external debt 
New borrowing approvals 
1 -  12 years maturity 
1-5  years maturity 
Public sector (billion pesos) 
public corporations 
national government 
Combined deficit,  13 monitored 







-3,886  - 
2,690 
9,998 
17.9  19.0 
27.1  29.0 
5.  I  5.  I 
-4,351  -4,150  - 
3,161  2,642 





































13.0  11.6  2.4  0.9 
Source: IMF (1984a;  1985a;  1986a) and Montes (1987). 538  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 7.6  Philippines 1985-86  Standby Program Assumptions 
1983  1984  1985  1986 
Actual  Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual 
External objectives 
Current account deficit 
(US$ billion) 
(percent of GNP) 
Exports (percent change $ value) 
Imports (percent change $ value) 
Trade balance (US$ billion) 
Gross domestic investment 
Total savings 
Gross national savings 
Foreign savings 
Money (percent increase, 


























-  1.6 
0.  I 
0.1 
0.2 
-  14.1 







-  1.0 
-3.5 
4.6 





























































8-  10 
10 
Source: IMF (1984a; 1985a; 1986a) and Montes (1987). 
Using  the  IMF assumptions on  the  course of  domestic prices and  real 
GNP,  the  program  limits  implied  a  reduction  in  real  reserve  money 
outstanding by the end of  1985 of 7 to 14 percent of their end of  1982 levels, 
which was before the jump in money supply took place. The ratio of reserve 
money to nominal GNP was assumed to rise only 7 to  15 percent from its 
end of  1982 level and be  well below its end of  1983 peak.  Broad money 
(M3) was projected to grow by  10 percent in  1984 and  13 percent in  1985. 
This implied a 20 to 30 percent rise in velocity from the end of 1982, again, 
before the huge monetary expansion took place. 
Both the IMF and the Philippines recognized that the government financial 
institutions (PNB, DBP, and PhilGuarantee) would run substantial deficits in 
both  1984 and  1985, even after rescheduling. There was no real scope for 
internal actions at DBP or PhilGuarantee, but some possibilities for reduced 
losses at PNB. One of  the performance criteria under the program  limited 
central bank credit to  PNB to a near constant amount over the life of  the 
program. 
The program required the elimination of  all external arrears by  the end of 
1985, and an increase in net international reserves of the central bank of $2.8 
billion  over  the  course of  the  year.  The  program  also  set  limits on  new 
medium-  and  long-term external borrowing and  ruled  out  an  increase  in 539  PhilippinesXhapter 7 
short-term debt for the entire program. The growth in exports and reduction 
in imports was assumed to be sufficient to generate a trade surplus by  1985. 
The program called for a rapid reduction of the public sector deficit, from 
3.2 percent of GNP in  1983 (already a substantial reduction from 1982) to 
1.4  percent during 1985. This was after the inclusion of government support 
to public financial institutions, whose shortfalls were expected to rise to 2 
percent of GNP in both 1984 and  1985 (IMF 1984c, 31). 
The Philippine letter of intent outlined a program of tax increases for 1985 
that was estimated would yield revenues of 2.1 percent of GNP (IMF 1984c, 
63)."  Continued sharp reductions in expenditure were also to take place. 
The Philippines agreed to cut the investment program of public corporations 
in half from 1983 to 1985. For the first time the standby program covered the 
deficits of  public corporations. The combined deficit of  the thirteen largest 
public nonfinancial corporations was to be limited to P.  13 billion (about 2.5 
percent of  GNP) for 1984 and to P.  2.4 billion for the first quarter of  1985 
(1.5 percent of GNP), with further quarterly limits to be set at the time of 
the first program review. 
The Philippine government raised price ceilings on controlled commodi- 
ties and increased administered prices for petroleum products and transport 
several times after the crisis. By  the end of  1984 retail prices for petroleum 
products were more than double their September 1983 levels and  electric 
power tariffs had been raised by 70 percent. During the negotiations with the 
IMF, the Philippines agreed to eliminate price ceilings for basic consumer 
commodities. By the end of  1984, this had been done for all commodities 
except rice, and rice followed during 1985. 
The Philippine government raised minimum wages for public and private 
employees  on  several  occasions  during  1983  and  1984,  although  the 
increases  did  not  match  the  rate  of  inflation.  In  addition,  there  were 
widespread complaints that firms were not abiding by minimum wage floors. 
Data on actual wages paid are scanty for the Philippines, but suggest a fall in 
real wages for unskilled manufacturing workers of  about 5 percent during 
1984. Actual compensation per employee in the national government was 
only 16.5 percent higher in  1984 than in  1983, despite a 50 percent rise in 
consumer prices.  As  part  of  the  IMF program,  the Philippines agreed to 
target wage increases for public sector workers at 22 percent during 1985, 
about the same as the estimated increase in prices. 
The IMF program was unique in  containing structural reform measures, 
measures that in some cases challenged the political base of  the martial law 
regime. These fell in the areas of tax reform, the rehabilitation of  financial 
institutions, and the dismantling of  public and quasi-public monopolies in 
the agricultural sector. On tax  matters, the program required a shift in  tax 
orientation away from international trade and toward domestic transactions. 
This entailed the reduction or elimination of the variety of  trade and foreign 
exchange  taxes  and  surcharges  that  the  Philippines  had  imposed  since 540  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
October  1983 and  the raising of  taxes on domestic  sales of  a number of 
commodities. The Fund also obtained agreement to reduce the wide range of 
tax  exemptions  available to  manufacturing firms through  BOI  incentives. 
The  Philippines  agreed  to  eliminate  tax  and  duty  exemptions  for  public 
corporations,  although  the  requirement  left  an  escape  clause  for  the 
Philippine government in which they could review and possibly reinstate the 
exemptions. 
By the time that the standby agreement was signed, the IMF had become 
more  aware  of  the  instability  of  the  domestic  financial  system.  In  the 
agreement, it endorsed a central bank plan to strengthen the financial system 
by  encouraging mergers.  The  agreement limited the  credit  of  the  central 
bank to PNB explicitly, and limited credit to financial institutions generally 
through  strict  limits  on  the  expansion  of  reserve  money.  The  Philippine 
government  also  agreed  to  prepare  rehabilitation  plans  for  government- 
owned financial institutions. 
The most  politically controversial part  of  the standby program  was  the 
requirement to disband government marketing and price restrictions in  the 
agricultural sector. The monopoly on importation and marketing of grains by 
the National Food  Authority (NFA) was the  most  important of  the purely 
public controls on agricultural transactions. But the production levies, export 
restrictions, and other marketing controls on the sugar and coconut industries 
were  far  more  important  in  the  Philippines.  Although  controls  in  these 
industries had  been  given the imprimatur of  public policy,  the institutions 
and the funds generated by  the controls were in private hands, those of two 
of  the  most  important  cronies  of  the  martial  law  regime.  Each  control 
scheme acted as a substantial tax  on production in the two most important 
traditional export sectors. The IMF program, in tandem with a World  Bank 
loan  for  the  agricultural  sector,  required  that  the  Philippine  government 
dismantle  these  controls  and  allow  producers  to  trade  at  market  prices 
through proposals to be worked out during subsequent program reviews. 
The  Marcos  government  generally  resisted  the  structural  measures 
affecting  the  most  important  monopolies,  dissolving  institutions  and 
announcing, but not effectively implementing, policy reforms. The monop- 
oly  on  flour  distribution  was  removed  from  the  NFA,  but  it  retained  a 
monopoly on wheat importation, with the pledge to gradually open it up to 
the private sector. The monopoly on exports of coconut products given to 
UNICOM and three other mills was abolished, but the ban on copra exports 
introduced in 1984 was maintained, as were the producer levies. In the sugar 
industry,  Philsucom  was  reconstituted  with  a  larger  representation  of 
planters, and NASUTRA was replaced by a new body owned by planters and 
millers.  Reform  of  the  sugar  industry  was  made  more  difficult  by  the 
extremely  low  world  sugar  price  and  the  large,  unpaid  NASUTRA 
obligations  to  planters.  Regulation  of  the  domestic  sugar  industry  was 
tightened,  and  producer  support  through  higher  domestic  prices  was 
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7.6  Rescheduling Agreements with Banks and Official Creditors 
7.6.1  Negotiations 
When the Philippines declared a ninety-day  moratorium on  17 October 
1983, the initial expectation among foreign bankers was that the reschedul- 
ing exercise for the Philippines would be quickly accomplished. Instead the 
negotiations for the Philippines proved  to  be  the  most  prolonged,  and  in 
some  ways  the  most  difficult,  of  any  of  the  LDC  borrowers.  Nineteen 
months  would  pass  before  the  Philippines  finally  signed  a  rescheduling 
agreement with its commercial creditors, and the moratorium was extended 
an additional six times. The reasons for the delay were varied. In part they 
reflected the inability of the Philippines to meet IMF prior conditions for the 
establishment of  the  standby program  on  which  the  financing  agreement 
hinged.  But  Philippine negotiations with  the  banks  were also held  up  by 
disagreements among the creditor banks on issues over which the Philippines 
had little control. 
Agreements with  the IMF and with  the bank  advisory committee were 
nearly concluded by  the end of  1983, before the discovery that the central 
bank  had  been  overstating  its  foreign  exchange  reserves  prior  to  the 
declaration of  the standstill.  l2 The Bank Advisory Committee had agreed to 
a proposal to  reschedule commercial bank debt falling due before 30 June 
1985 and to extend $1.6 billion in new  money to the Philippines, when the 
reserves overstatement was discovered. 
This disclosure did more than push the negotiations back to their starting 
point.  The  trust  that  external creditors had  in  the  Philippine  technocrats 
vanished, and the emphasis in both bank and Fund negotiations shifted to 
prior conditions, frequent review, and “backloading”  -pushing  the largest 
funds releases to the end of  a program,  after intermediate conditions had 
been  met.  The  reserves  disclosure  and  the  subsequent discovery  of  the 
extraordinary increase in the money  supply in  the latter part  of  1983 also 
increased  the  importance  of  the  IMF negotiations  for  a  revised  standby 
agreement, and for much of  1984 the commercial bank negotiations receded 
to the background. Negotiations with the bank advisory committee resumed 
in March 1984, only to be postponed until June, pending the completion of 
an IMF standby agreement. By the end of October a new Philippine letter of 
intent was drafted and sent to the IMF for approval. With the outlines of an 
IMF program in place, negotiations with the banks resumed in November. 
The original financial package, negotiated in the latter part of 1983, called 
for a rescheduling of $9.1 billion in commercial and official loans maturing 
between the declaration of the moratorium and the end of  1984. In addition, 
there was a new money component of $3.3 billion, evenly divided between 
official  and  commercial  bank  creditors,  as  well  as  the  IMF  standby 
arrangement of  $650  million.  The  $1.6  billion  new  money  proposal  for 
commercial banks represented about 10 percent of their outstanding exposure 542  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
to the Philippines,  a relatively large new  commitment.  With  the delay in 
reaching a new  agreement with the  IMF in  1984 came  increasing doubts 
among commercial banks of  the willingness of  the Marcos government to 
carry through adjustment measures,  and an increasing reluctance to extend 
money to the Philippines. By the summer of  1984 the financial programming 
included all of  1985, with the proposal of $1.6 billion from the commercial 
banks extending over two years, and now including $2.7 billion in additional 
money from bilateral and official creditors. 
Once the Philippines reached an agreement with the IMF and the letter of 
intent was sent, negotiations with the official creditors proceeded quickly. 
These were concluded on 20 December 1984, and the outcome is described 
in  table  7.7.  The  restructuring  covered  100 percent  of  principal  and  60 
percent of interest falling due between  1 January  1985 and June  1986. The 
remaining  40  percent  of  interest  became  payable  on  a  staggered  basis, 
ending September 1987. Due but unpaid principal and interest on obligations 
up to the end of  1984 (about $200 million) became payable over eighteen 
months.  In  addition  to  restructuring  existing  obligations,  the  agreement 
included long-term new money from official sources of  $2.2 billion, slightly 
below the figure discussed in midsummer and early autumn. However, the 
creditor  bank  negotiations continued  to  be  difficult and  extended on  into 
1985. 
7.6.2  Complications in the Negotiations 
The primary reason  for the delay in  negotiating an  agreement with  the 
commercial banks was the difficulty that the Philippines had in reaching an 
agreement with the IMF. However, there were three additional issues that 
complicated  the  negotiation  process  with  the  banks,  only  one  of  which 
directly involved the Philippines. 
Table 7.7  Philippine Debt Restructuring Agreement, May 1985 
Commercial bank  Amount  Maturity 
rescheduling  ($ billion)  (grace)  Interest Spread 
Debt falling due  5.88  10 (5 yrsj  I H 
New money  0.925  9 (4 YES)  1  'Y4 
Trade facility  2.97  1% 
Total  9.69 
Principal Amount  Interest Amount 
Official Creditors  $ billion  I  $ billion  B 
20 December  1984  0.725  100  0.258  60 
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The  first  issue  arose  immediately  after  the  Philippines  declared  a 
moratorium  on  17  October  1983.  The  Manila  branch  of  Citibank  had 
accepted approximately $600  million  in  interbank deposits  in  its  foreign 
currency deposit unit.  When  the Philippines declared a moratorium these 
deposits were blocked, and Citibank refused to make good the deposits from 
its home office. Several major creditors were affected by the Citibank action, 
including Wells Fargo of  San Francisco, which filed suit against Citibank in 
New York to recover $2 million in deposits in the Citibank unit. 
Two independent issues were involved in the Citibank FCDU dispute. The 
first was the status of  the interbank deposits that other creditors had placed 
with  Citibank’s Manila  office,  and  the  terms under  which  those deposits 
could be withdrawn. The second issue concerned the responsibility for that 
foreign  exchange  exposure  to  the  Philippines-whether  Citibank,  or  its 
depositors, would have to put up the pro rata share for those deposits in any 
new money agreement for the Philippines. 
The dispute was resolved in stages. In April, Citibarik received permission 
from the central bank  to remit 46  percent  of  the FCDU  deposits to their 
owners.13 The dispute over the remaining deposits and the exposure issue 
continued  until  November,  when  a  compromise  was  reached.  Citibank 
converted the remaining interbank deposits to four-year time deposits and 
accepted new money exposure for the 46 percent portion that it had remitted 
in April. 
The second issue involved approximately $57 million in loans to Planters 
Products,  Inc.  (PPI),  the  largest  importedmarketer  of  fertilizers  in  the 
Philippines. The company was in the private sector, and the loans did not 
carry a government guarantee. It was the insistence of PPI’s creditors that 
the Philippines assume the obligations of the firm that formed the basis of the 
dispute. 
The  Philippine government  administered price  ceilings  for  fertilizer,  a 
program started when world fertilizer prices rose sharply in  1973. Losses on 
fertilizer imports and on domestic production of fertilizer were made up by a 
subsidy program for firms in the industry, a program of which PPI had been 
the largest beneficiary. The company encountered severe financial difficulties 
after October  1983 because of  restricted supplies of  foreign exchange for 
imports and  because the government fell behind  in its subsidy payments. 
PPI’s  creditors  argued  that  the  firm  was  in  effect  a  state-controlled 
corporation and the government’s failure to provide the subsidies to which 
PPI was entitled was the reason for its financial difficulties. The creditors 
demanded  that  the  Philippine government  assume  the  loans  before  they 
would participate in the commercial bank rescheduling. 
The Philippines finally worked out a compromise on PPI. The loans would 
remain  in  the  private  sector.  However,  Finance Minister Virata  signed a 
letter of undertaking in May  1985 stating that the central bank would satisfy 
PPI’s subsidy claim and that a rehabilitation program for the company would 544  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
be  initiated. While  this  compromise allowed the bank  rescheduling to go 
forward,  it  did  not  lay  to  rest  the  PPI  issue,  which  reappeared  in  the 
negotiations in  1987, 
The last issue that almost derailed the negotiations was the reluctance of  a 
major creditor bank to participate. The National Commercial Bank of  Saudi 
Arabia  had  roughly  $150  million  in  trade  financing  exposure  to  the 
Philippines.  The  bank  initially  refused  to  participate  in  the  rescheduling 
program,  holding  out  for  a  separate  agreement  with  the  Philippines.  l4 
Manufacturer’s Hanover, the lead bank in the advisory committee, refused to 
sign an accord without the participation of National Commercial. This issue, 
along with the dispute over PPI, held up the commercial bank agreement for 
several months until National Commercial finally agreed in  April  1985 to 
participate in the program. 
The Philippine government finally signed its restructuring agreement with 
the bank advisory committee on 20 May  1985, over a year and a half after 
the country had declared its first moratorium. The terms of that restructuring 
agreement are also outlined in table 7.7. The agreement had three parts. The 
first  was  a rescheduling of  $5.88  billion  in  debt  falling  due between  17 
October 1983 and 31 December 1986. Of this restructured debt, about $3.4 
billion, or 57 percent, was short-term debt. 
The  restructuring agreement included  different provisions for  debt  that 
was owed or guaranteed by  the public sector, debt of  the private financial 
sector, and nonguaranteed debt owed by  the private corporate sector. The 
outlines of  the programs and the amounts involved are shown in table 7.8. 
Of  these, the procedures for the restructuring of private corporate sector debt 
were the most  complex. Creditors and their corporate debtors were left to 
work out arrangements for repayment of  existing loans.  Repayments could 
be made on the original schedule or they could be restructured. In addition, 
the  central  bank  offered  an  option  for  foreign  exchange  cover  for 
restructured private corporate debt. A final option, similar to the FICORCA 
program  in  Mexico,  offered  forward  exchange  protection  and  credit 
assistance for  corporate  borrowers  in  financial  distress.  l5  For  all  of  the 
options  under  the  private  corporate  borrowers  program,  counterpart 
payments were  made to  the  central bank  on  the agreed schedule and  the 
central bank assumed the corresponding external obligation, payable on the 
same  schedule  as  restructured  public  sector  debt.  In  each  case,  the 
commercial risk of  the loan was borne by  the original lender. l6 
The  agreement  also  included  a  new  money  commitment  by  the 
commercial banks  of  $925  million,  or  7.5 percent  of  their  outstanding 
commitments on the date of  the moratorium. This facility carried an interest 
rate spread of  1% percent over LIBOR, although a creditor bank could, at its 
option, receive its domestic prime rate plus  1% percent. 
The  last  part  of  the  commercial  bank  agreement  was  a  $2.97  billion 
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Table 7.8  Commercial Bank Financing Program, May 1985 
Amount  Maturity  Spread 
(million $)  (grace)  over LIBOR  Facility Fee (%) 
Rescheduling: 
Public sector debt 
Medium, long term 
Short term 
Total 
Private financial debt 
Medium, long term 
Short term 
Total 
Private corporate debt 




New money facility 















10 (5 yrs)" 
10 (5 yrs)" 
9 (5 Y") 
30 June 87' 
I % 
1% 
1  % 
<2 
1  %s' 
1 %a 
1  5/ab 
1% 
Source: Central bank. 
"Once counterpart deposit has been made and the central  bank  has assumed the external obligation. 
bOr  1%  over prime, at creditor bank's option. 
'Facility  exists through 31 December  1986. final  maturity date 30 June  1987. 
dkr  annum. 
outstanding at the time of the moratorium, and each commercial bank agreed 
to maintain  a  level  of  exposure  that  was  the  same as that  on  17 October 
1983. The trade facility also included central bank overdrafts run up before 
the moratorium.  Availments  from the trade facility could be used  to repay 
current and past due trade obligations. Any unutilized portion of the facility 
was to be placed on deposit with the central bank. The trade facility carried 
an interest spread of 1  '/4  percent over LIBOR and a facility fee of Yx  percent. 
The new money commitment, at $925 billion, was well below the original 
proposals  of  $1.6 billion  in  additional money from the commercial  banks. 
The total  financial  commitment  of  the commercial  banks  in  the  Philippine 
program  was  roughly  the  same, with  the  smaller  amount  of  new  money 
balanced  by  the  larger  rescheduled  amounts.  Much  of  the  difference  was 
absorbed  in  the  trade  facility,  which  greatly  exceeded  the  need  of  the 
Philippines for trade finance.  l7 
The  terms  that  the  Philippines  received  in  this  first  rescheduling  were 
roughly comparable to those negotiated  with other LDCs at that time (Chile 
in  November  1984, Costa  Rica  in  May  1985, and  Argentina  in  August 
1985), although they were less favorable than the terms that Mexico received 
in  March  and August  1985."  But, reflecting  the  suspicion with which  the 
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the new money facility were pushed toward the end of the program. The first 
drawing,  to be  made after the Philippines passed the  second IMF program 
review, was for $400 million, almost all of  which went to settle outstanding 
arrears.  Subsequent  drawings  were  scheduled  for  $100  million,  $175 
million,  and  a  final  drawing  of  $350  million  after  the  Philippines  had 
successfully completed its IMF review at the end of March  1986. 
7.7  Evaluating the Adjustment Period 
Measured  purely  in  terms  of  stabilization,  the  Philippine  adjustment 
program  in  1984 and  1985 was  a great  success.  The country  was  able to 
meet  its  external  balance  requirements  under  the  IMF program.  External 
arrears were eliminated by  the end of  1985, and net  international reserves 
rose faster than the program required.  The current account deficit narrowed 
sharply and in  1985 was virtually balanced, a much greater change than had 
been anticipated  in the program (see table 7.6). The extent of the Philippine 
adjustment may be gauged from the shift in the noninterest current account 
shown in table 7.9. In just two years this balance increased by 9 percent of 
GNP. 
The Philippines  was  also  successful  in  rapidly  bringing  inflation  under 
control. l9 The consumer price index was rising at rates of 50 to 70 percent 
throughout  1984 (see fig. 7.2). But by May  1985 the inflation rate over the 
previous  six  months  had  been  reduced  to  an  annual  rate  of  less  than  10 
percent. Over the entire year 1985 (December to December) consumer prices 
increased by  5.7 percent,  the lowest inflation  rate  since the  1960s. During 
1986 consumer prices actually fell. 
Thus the Philippines, which had been borrowing abroad in the amount of 
8 percent of GNP, was successful in making the adjustment to the severing of 
its  access  to  the  world  capital  market.  However,  this  stabilization  was 
purchased at a tremendous cost of output and income and with considerable 
damage to the financial system and many industries. Real GNP by  1985 had 
fallen 10.4 percent from its 1983 level. Per capita incomes fell by about  15 
percent, which erased almost all of the gains since the first oil shock. 
The effect was particularly severe on investment, which fell by 50 percent 
during this  two-year  period.  By  January  1985 the unemployment  rate had 
Table 7.9  Noninterest Current Account Balance (in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Balance  -  1,575  -  1,139  820  1.827  2,813  1,687 
% of GNP  -4.0  -3.3  2.6  5.8  9.3  4.9 
Source:  Central bank, and NEDA, National Accounts Section 547  Philippines/Chapter 7 
risen  to  14  percent  and  the  underemployment rate  was  estimated  at  45 
percent.  Although increases in  legislated minimum wages did  not  nearly 
compensate  for  the  rise  in  prices  after  1983,  there  was  widespread 
noncompliance, leading to increased, although still illegal, strikes in  1985. 
The recession was unevenly distributed across sectors, as is shown in table 
7.10. Conditions were generally less severe in the rural areas. Agricultural 
output  continued to  grow  through  the  period  after  1983,  as  devaluation 
increased production incentives and  real  incomes  in  the rural  areas. The 
sugar industry, however, is a glaring exception to this characterization. The 
collapse of  international sugar prices,  the expiration of  long-term supply 
contracts signed at favorable prices, and the inability of NASUTRA to make 
payments to sugar millers and  producers, left many producers and  workers 
Table 7.10  Real GDP  by Sector and Manufacturing Industry Real Gross Value Added 
(total percentage change) 
1983-85  1985-87 
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destitute and led to widespread famine in the province of Negros Occidental. 
Output in the mining  sector also dropped  sharply during this period,  again 
because of  weak external prices. 
The costs of  the stabilization program itself were felt most heavily in the 
urban  sector-by  the construction and manufacturing  industries and by  the 
urban wage earner. The sharp fall in domestic investment led to a collapse of 
the  construction  industry.  Within  manufacturing,  the  industries  that  were 
hardest hit were the industries that the system of trade protection had worked 
so hard to protect-import-substituting  industries producing intermediates or 
durable  goods.  In  some  cases,  such  as  in  transport  equipment,  major 
portions  of  the  manufacturing  sector  went  under  during  the  stabilization 
episode.  Export-oriented  industries,  such as footwear, electrical machinery, 
and much of  miscellaneous manufacturing,  fared better,  although even here 
the recession had its costs. 
Labor force data for the Philippines is sketchy, but indicates that industrial 
employment  fell  by  about  9 percent  between  1983 and  1985. Legislated 
minimum wages for nonagricultural workers fell in real terms each year after 
1981. Actual compensation paid also fell in real terms during the 1980s; data 
from the National Wages Council estimates the drop for unskilled workers in 
Manila at 5 percent  in  1984.'' 
In the sections that follow we look more closely at how the external and 
inflation  adjustments  were  achieved  and  the  reasons  for their  high  output 
costs. 
7.7.1  External Adjustment 
Between  1983 and 1985 the dollar value of merchandise imports fell by 32 
percent.  It  was  this  compression  of  imports that  was  responsible  for  the 
elimination  of  the  current  account  deficit.  Imports were  reduced  through 
lower  incomes  and,  in  particular,  through  the  reduction  of  domestic 
investment. Capital goods imports fell by 54 percent over the same period. 
However,  the  severe  shortage  of  foreign  exchange,  high  black  market 
currency premiums, and the tightening of quantitative restrictions on imports 
were also responsible for some of the drop. 
Exports present a mixed picture, rising by more than expected in 1984 and 
then falling sharplly in 1985. Over the entire 1983-85  period the dollar value 
of  merchandise exports fell by 7.5 percent.  Exports of  the major traditional 
commodities-sugar,  coconut  products,  lumber,  gold,  and  copper 
concentrates-fell  in volume as well as value during the period. This was the 
result of weak external prices, shifts in domestic production incentives away 
from traditional commodities,  and  in  some cases, poor  weather.  Nontradi- 
tional  manufacturers exports did reasonably well,  with very strong gains in 
1984 and somewhat weaker performance in  1985. 
Although exchange  and  tax  policy  was designed  to shield nontraditional 
exports, there is still evidence that this  sector was hurt by  the stabilization 549  PhilippinesKhapter 7 
period.  Consignment imports  were  allowed  without restriction,  and  some 
firms  with  foreign partners  were  able  to  finance imports  through  equity 
contributions  from  their  parent  firms.  However,  domestic  credit  was 
extremely tight,  and  there  were  shortages  of  foreign  exchange  even  for 
goods on the priority  allocation list.  Indirect evidence of  the effect of  the 
disruption of  the  domestic  economy  on  the  manufacturing export  sector 
comes from Philippine performance in its largest export market, the United 
States.  The  Philippines  lost  market  share  to  other  exporters  during  this 
period in most of its important nontraditional exports (table 7.11). 
While the Philippines reduced import levels, it had less success in shifting 
the balance of incentives in favor of the production of  tradable goods. The 
peso  had  appreciated steadily in real terms from  1978 to  1982, measured 
both by  comparison with the currencies of  the Philippines’ trading partners 
and  by  the  ratio  of  traded  to  nontraded  goods  prices  domestically. The 
devaluations of  1983 and 1984 reversed this process, but did not succeed in 
decisively shifting the real  exchange rate  in  the Philippines. Although the 
devaluations were large, they were mostly offset by  high rates of inflation in 
the  country.  In  addition,  the  disparities  in  protection rates  across  sectors 
widened considerably during this early period,  increasing the protection of 
much of the domestic industrial sector. The peso actually appreciated at the 
end of  1984 and in early 1985, eliminating the gains in competitiveness that 
had  taken  place  in  the  two  previous  years  (see  fig.  7.1).  The  real 
depreciation that took place during 1986 was mainly due to the fall of  the 
dollar; the Philippine peso experienced little change against the currencies of 
its Asian competitors. 
In summary, the Philippines was successful in dealing with the break in 
external  funding  and  the  severe  foreign  exchange  constraint  of  the 
adjustment period. The way in which this was done, however, increased the 
domestic output cost of  the adjustment. What is more important is that the 
Philippines failed during this period  to make the relative price adjustment 
Table 7.11  Share of Philippine Exports in U.S. Imports (percentage) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Refined sugar 
Lumber, shaped 
Copper ore, etc. 
Coconut oil 
Transistors, valves, etc. 
Electronic microcircuits 
Electronic components 
Furniture, parts thereof 
Clothing 
Footwear 
8.7  5.9  8.1  10.6  10.9  13.2  12.6 
11.5  14.1  8.4  13.5  11.9  10.4  8.5 
58.4  50.5  27.7  17.3  24.6  0.0  0.0 
83.1  91.7  91.3  86.6  79.7  64.6  90.1 
9.9  11.9  12.7  12.3  10.5  9.3  7.2 
12.2  14.8  15.5  14.7  12.0  11.6  9.5 
1.1  1.1  2.2  4.3  6.0  3.9  2.2 
4.4  5.4  3.9  3.4  3.0  2.4  2.0 
3.5  3.7  3.3  3.3  3. I  3.0  2.7 
I .3  1.6  i .0  0.7  0.6  0.3  0.3 
Source:  UN Commodity Trade Statistics,  series D 550  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
that would  facilitate a resumption of  economic growth  in  the face of the 
terms of trade deterioration that the economy experienced and the restricted 
access to  international capital  markets that  the  rest  of  the  decade  would 
entail. The adjustment episode halted and partially reversed the movement 
toward trade liberalization in the 1980s and did little to change real exchange 
rates. 
7.7.2  Domestic Absorption 
The current account balance reflects  dependence on  foreign savings as 
well as the balance in trade and service flows. Thus, the elimination of  the 
current account deficit in the Philippines was also matched by an equivalent 
reduction  in  reliance on  foreign capital to  support  domestic expenditure. 
Here we examine how this reduction was achieved. 
We  divide the economy into public, private, and foreign sectors, each of 
which can draw capital from, or provide excess savings to, the other sectors. 
The current account deficit of  the Philippines is just  the  net  demand for 
additional savings from  the  public and  private  sectors combined.  This  is 
shown in table 7.12, which is based on national income statistics. 
During  the  adjustment period,  1983 to  1985, both  the  private and  the 
public sector reduced their dependence on external finance. The adjustment 
was considerably larger in the private sector, where the net deficit position 
(investment minus savings) was reduced by 6.2 percent of GNP, compared to 
a reduction of  1.8 percent of  GNP for the public sector. The extent of  the 
adjustment by the private sector is even more apparent from the gross figures 
on  investment and  savings. The change in  the  net  balance  of  the  private 
sector was achieved in the midst of rapidly falling private sector savings. The 
Table 7.12  SavingdInvestment  Balances (percentage of  GNP) 












Net foreign resourcesicurrent  account 
23.73  22.67  21.61  21.43  15.05  12.57 
20.75  21.88  18.02  16.57  12.33  13.95 
5.98  6.51  3.25  1.97  -0.80  -0.53 
5.49  5.27  4.44  4.27  2.67  3.50 
9.28  10.10  10.33  10.33  10.46  10.98 
-2.99  -0.80  -3.59  -4.87  -2.72  1.38 
6.94  8.04  7.16  6.09  4.11  3.69 
4.98  3.79  3.20  4.00  4.02  3.37 
-1.96  -4.25  -3.96  -2.09  -0.08  -0.33 
4.95  5.05  7.55  6.96  2.75  -1.05 
Source:  NEDA,  National Accounts Section. 
“Includes savings by government-owned  corporations. 
blncluding statistical discrepancy. 
‘National  government plus government corporations. 551  PhilippinesKhapter 7 
reduction in private sector investment is enormous-over 10 percent of GNP 
since the early 1980s. Since depreciation remained roughly constant at about 
10  percent  of  GNP,  net  investment  by  the  private  sector  practically 
disappeared during this period. 
Both  individuals  and  corporations  sharply  reduced  their  savings  after 
1982.  A  number  of  factors  led  to  the  drop  in  savings:  a  reduction  of 
corporate incomes during the domestic recession, an increase in capital flight 
that  occurred  in  1982 and  1983, and  the  desire to cushion  consumption 
expenditure over the adjustment period. The Philippines is unusual among 
countries  that  went  through  adjustment  during  this  period  in  that  real 
consumption expenditure actually increased steadily throughout the process. 
(Although  this  was  not  enough  to  sustain  real  per  capita  consumption 
expenditure, which fell by  3.3 percent from 1983 to  1985.) 
7.7.3  Monetary Policy and Inflation 
The Philippines was highly successful in reducing the domestic inflation 
rate, in contrast to many other countries that have tried to adjust to a debt 
crisis. The domestic inflation rate dropped as quickly as it had risen in the 
Philippines; by  1985 consumer prices were rising at their lowest rate in two 
decades, and prices actually fell during 1986. Three factors account for the 
rapid reduction of the inflation rate: a tight monetary policy, the stabilization 
and unification of the exchange rate, and the absence of  indexing and other 
features that add momentum to inflation. 
The  various  indicators of  monetary  growth  in  table  7.13  indicate the 
tightness of  monetary policy  in  1984 and  1985 after the huge growth that 
took place in  1983. The growth rate of  nominal money in circulation, both 
M1  and M3, was  low  by  historical standards, and  the real  money  supply 
dropped sharply in  1984. By  December  1984 the  real  values  of  all three 
aggregates were at their lowest points for the decade. Velocity measures for 
money in circulation increased sharply in  1984, in line with the tightening of 
policy.  The  course  of  reserve  money  was  quite  different,  reflecting  the 
substantial fall in  the money  multiplier that  took  place between  1982 and 
1985. This was the result of  increased currency holdings by  the public, as 
confidence in  financial institutions diminished, and the substantial increases 
in reserve requirements of  1983 and 1984. 
Interest rates lagged behind the increase in inflation in 1983 and its retreat 
in  1985. As  a result,  real  interest rates,  though  negative during  most  of 
1984, were at historically high levels through most of  1985 and 1986 (figure 
7.3). The high real interest rates of these two years were the product not only 
of  slow monetary growth, but  also of  the heavy public sector demands on 
available credit, a point which is discussed below. 
The second reason for the reduction in  inflation was the steadying of  the 
exchange rate  after October  1984 and  the narrowing of  the black  market 
premium on foreign exchange, as bank trading in foreign exchange resumed. 552  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 7.13  Money Supply and Growth Rates (billion pesos and percentages) 


















































































































Source:  Central bank, Annual Report and Philippine Financial  Statistics. 
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Monthly  values  of  the  exchange  rate  and  the  black  market  premium  are 
shown in table 7.1 above. The black market premium was finally eliminated 
with the floating of the exchange rate in October 1984, and the exchange rate 
hit  a  peak  the  next  month,  In  November  the  central  bank  reduced  its 
purchases of foreign exchange  in the market,  and from November  1984 to 
June  1985 the exchange rate appreciated against the dollar, rising by a total 
of  7  percent  before  starting to  depreciate  again.  However,  the  nominal 
appreciation of the peso resulted in an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
of  about  11 percent  (see table  7.2 and fig.  7.1). This reversal of  the  real 
exchange  depreciation  immediately  became  an  issue  with  the  IMF during 
and after the first standby review. The Philippine government argued that the 
limits on growth of reserve  money prevented them from intervening in the 
foreign exchange market to prevent the peso’s rise. The Fund in turn argued 
that  remaining  restrictions  on  bank  holdings  of  foreign  exchange  had 
prevented  them  from  purchasing  and  in fact  had  turned  some banks  into 
unwilling net sellers (IMF 1985a, 11 -  12). 
The final reason for the sharp reduction  in inflation  in the Philippines  is 
the  absence  of  many  of  the  institutional  features  that  tend  to  perpetuate 
inflation  in  other  countries.  Price  ceilings  and  administratively  set  prices 
were adjusted rapidly during this period to changes in the exchange rate and 
increases in external prices. In addition,  by the end of  1984 most consumer 
goods price ceilings had been removed.  Thus there was no buildup of price 
increases  that  had  not  yet  been  passed  through  to  consumers.  Nor  were 
wages a source of inflationary  pressure.  Only about  10 percent  of the labor 
force  was  unionized,  and  unions  remained  relatively  weak  under martial 
law.21  Strikes  were  banned  in  vital  industries,  and  prenotification  was 
required for strikes in other industries. The government set minimum wages 
for  agricultural  and  nonagricultural  workers,  with  upward  adjustments  for 
cost of living increases.  However, the adjustments were not automatic,  and 
in  the  early  1980s  real  minimum  wages  fell  significantly.  In  addition, 
distressed firms could apply to the National Wages Council for an exemption 
from  the  minimum  wage  rules,  and  noncompliance  with  minimum  wage 
requirements was widespread.  Finally, and most importantly, there seems to 
be a remarkable ability among the Philippine populace to tolerate real wage 
declines. Real wages fell significantly after the decontrol episode in the early 
1960s and after both oil price shocks. 
This characteristic  of the Philippine  inflation  process-rapid  rises in  the 
inflation rate followed by equally rapid declines-is  evident from the first oil 
shock  and  from  other inflation  episodes  in  the  country’s  postwar  history. 
With  this  kind  of  inflation  process,  the  tight  monetary  policy  that  was 
imposed  in  1984 and maintained  through  1985 and  into 1986, despite  the 
very  low  rate  of  inflation  at the  end, was a case of  misplaced  worry  and 
significant overkill. While the Philippines definitely  had inflation wrung out 
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other characteristics of  financial  institution policy,  resulted  in  the  virtual 
drying up of  private domestic credit,  as well as huge increases in  its cost 
when available. The extreme domestic credit stringency drove many firms to 
the  wall,  both  nonfinancial  and  financial,  and  left  the  financial  system 
unwilling to take on anything but the most minimal lending risk. 
The  1984-85  period  saw  continuing  expansionary  influences  on  the 
money  supply.  These  included  the  expiration  of  the  remaining  forward 
contracts on foreign exchange, an almost doubling of net credit to the public 
sector,  increasing  assistance  to  financial  institutions  in  distress,  and 
mounting interest payments on outstanding central bank securities. However, 
in the last half of  1984 and throughout 1985 the central bank maintained a 
very tight monetary policy. Reserve money, the monetary component subject 
to ceiling in the IMF adjustment program, increased by only 11 percent from 
the  end  of  1984  to  the  end  of  1985.  When  reserve  deficiencies  and 
reserve-eligible government  securities are  included,  the  base  for  deposit 
expansion increased by  only 8 percent during the year. To  achieve a tight 
overall policy, the central bank sold large amounts of its own securities to the 
banking system and directly to the public. 
As discussed above in section 7.5.1, the sale of Job0 bills began in earnest 
in August  1984. These had short maturity, large denomination, and flexible 
interest rates, and defined a floor rate of interest for fully secured loans and 
other financial obligations. Between June and December 1984 the stock of 
outstanding central bank securities rose from P.  10 billion to P.  14 billion, or 
to  15 percent of the domestic credit extension of the central bank (see table 
The central bank continued to sell its own securities in  1985. In addition, 
starting in the first quarter of  that year it entered into a number of  reverse 
repurchase agreements with commercial banks. Under a reverse repurchase 
agreement, the central bank would sell government securities to a bank with 
an agreement to repurchase them at  an  agreed upon  price at  a later date 
(typically  thirty  days).  By  September  1985,  outstanding  central  bank 
securities and reverse repurchase agreements had risen to over P.  38 billion 
(28 percent  of  the  domestic credit  extension of  the  central  bank)  before 
diminishing toward the end of the year. 
Credit tightened dramatically in  1984 and  1985 as a result of the stricter 
monetary policy of the central bank and also due to an unprecedented fall in 
intermediation by  the  financial  sector.  The  real  money  stock  fell  by  31 
percent between  the end of  1983 and the end of  1985, while real  M3,  a 
measure of funds available from banks and quasibanks, fell by  26 percent. 
The fall in domestic intermediation had a number of causes. The first was 
uncertainty about the safety of  the financial system, which led to increased 
demand  for  currency  by  the  public.  Diminished  confidence  particularly 
affected  nonbank  institutions  active  in  the  money  market-investment 
companies and  finance companies-as  deposit-substitute holdings dropped 
7.3).** 555  Philippinesichapter  7 
by  over two-thirds in real terms. The financial system was also affected by 
significant disintermediation, as the central bank and the Treasury sold their 
securities directly to the public.  Between the end of  1983 and the end of 
1985, central bank  and national government securities held  by  the  public 
increased from P. 19 billion to P.  56 billion, reaching a level corresponding 
to 42 percent of M3. 
Commercial  banks  responded  to  the  credit  tightness  and  increased 
uncertainty in the financial markets in much the same way as did the public, 
by  shifting  into  safer  and  more  liquid  assets.  In  table  7.14  we  show 
components of commercial bank asset portfolios in the Philippines. Between 
December 1983 and September 1985 there was a significant increase in bank 
holdings  of  liquid  assets,  particularly  in  their  holding  of  central  bank 
securities and reverse repurchase agreements. At the same time, there was a 
shift out of other assets, particularly loans and discounts, which fell over the 
period in nominal terms and by  44 percent in real terms. The result of  this 
shift in bank asset portfolios, combined with the direct sale of  government 
securities to  the  public,  was  a  significant redirection  of  available  credit 
toward the public sector and away from the private sector. Domestic credit to 
the private sector fell by  20 percent in  nominal terms and by  50 percent in 
real terms between the end of  1983 and the end of  1985. Here, as in the case 
of  expenditure, most of  the adjustment was done by  the private sector. 
Some fall in private credit demand would have been inevitable given the 
reduction  in  expenditure  that  the  stabilization  program  entailed  and  the 
foreign exchange constraints that  limited  imports of  necessary  inputs and 
equipment  for  many  industries.  However,  the  reductions  in  real  credit 
Table 7.14  Commercial Bank  Asset Portfolios (billion pesos) 
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Loans & discounts 
Memo item: real loans & 
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Source: Business Day. quarterly surveys, data from published bank Statements of Condition. 
Note: 
Liquid assets: Cash, checks, due from the cenhlil bank and other banks, secured trade accounts, bonds. 
Total  loans:  Loans and  discounts, interbank  loans,  agricultudagrarian  reform  bonds, bills  purchased, 
customer liabilities. 
Real loans: Deflated by  monthly consumer price  index. 556  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
availability  were  far greater  than  output  reductions  in  the  economy  as a 
whole  and  in  manufacturing,  and  there  were  numerous  complaints  in  the 
Philippines about the availability of credit as well as its cost. This was true 
even in industries that were not as market limited as manufacturing,  such as 
export  industries  and  agriculture.  Commercial  bank  credit  to  agriculture 
declined by 36 percent in nominal terms in 1984 and stayed constant in 1985 
(Montes  1987, 29).  For  industrial  forms  the  result  of  the  stringent  credit 
measures  was  widespread  bankruptcy,  particularly  among  firms  in  the 
import-substituting  manufacturing  sectors,  although  data  on the  extent  of 
insolvencies  is very  sketchy.  Perhaps  one-quarter to one-third  of  all  firms 
faced  debt  servicing  problems.23  In  many  cases,  newer,  technologically 
efficient firms with high debvequity ratios went bankrupt, while less efficient 
but less extended firms survived (World Bank  1987, 10). Among surviving 
firms there has been a significant deterioration in financial ratios, particularly 
in  sugar milling, mining,  construction,  and cement. 
The stabilization episode was also an extremely difficult one for financial 
institutions.  Sharply increased interest rates in 1984, after a period in which 
the government had been urging banks to lend on longer term, caught many 
banks in a term squeeze as funding costs increased faster than the earnings of 
loan portfolios.  In addition,  the high  reserve requirement  (which yielded 4 
percent  interest)  plus  the  25  percent  lending  to  agriculture  requirement 
(much of which was met through government bonds yielding 9 percent) plus 
a  tax  on  gross  bank  receipts  resulted  in  a  very  high  rate  of  taxation  of 
intermediation  when  inflation  rates  rose.  This  raised  break-even  bank 
spreads,  causing  difficulties  for  banks  and  their  loan  customers.24 The 
domestic  recession  and  high  interest  rates  turned  many  loans  into 
nonperformers.  Finally,  the general financial  uncertainty  and instability led 
to  substantial  withdrawals  from  several  institutions,  including  investment 
houses and finance companies, one major savings bank, and several smaller 
banks.  Twenty-three  financial  institutions failed  in  1984 and  another  fifty- 
eight  failed in  1985 (IMF 1986b, 34). Central  bank  emergency  assistance 
increased  sharply  on  several  occasions  during  1984-86,  threatening  the 
country’s  monetary  targets.  The system for delivery  of  credit  to the  rural 
sector  essentially  broke  down. The bank  responsible  for financing  of  the 
sugar  industry,  Republic  Planters,  became  insolvent.  Over  100  of  the 
roughly  1,000 rural banks became insolvent, and arrearages of rural banks as 
a  proportion  of  central  bank  rediscounts  to  them  reached  83 percent  in 
1985.25 
Ironically,  what  may  have  saved  many  financial  institutions  was  the 
extensive central bank borrowing at high interest rates that allowed banks to 
greatly increase the yield and liquidity of their portfolio by buying securities. 
This eventually involved large transfer of interest payments from the central 
bank and the passing of the brunt of the adjustment to the bank’s traditional 
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7.8  Conclusions on the Adjustment 
The  crisis  and  adjustment period  in  the  Philippines reflects  a  striking 
about-face in  Philippine relations with  the IMF and  its external creditors. 
After a period of  relatively lenient standby programs, regularly exceeded by 
the  Philippines and  then  renewed,  the  Philippines  was  placed  under  an 
extremely stringent program that was successfully carried out in what would 
prove to be the last months of  Marcos’ hold on power. 
This period demonstrates that  institutions have memories, and these are 
reflected in their programs. The events of  1983-the  speed with which the 
1983 program  targets  were  exceeded,  the  overstatement  of  international 
reserves, and the tremendous increase in  the monetary base-all  served to 
transform the  IMF from  “doting  parent  to  vengeful god”  (Montes  1987, 
21).  This  resulted  in  prior  conditions  and  an  IMF  program  that  were 
unusually harsh.26  The stringency of the adjustment that was actually carried 
out also reflected the unwillingness of creditors to supply additional funds to 
the Philippines and  resulting capital inflows that  were  less than  the  IMF 
program.  The  Philippines compounded its  problems  by  waiting  until  its 
foreign exchange reserves  were  almost  exhausted,  by  failing  to  draw  on 
standby credits that it had negotiated, and by  delaying its declaration of a 
moratorium until after the central bank had run up substantial overdrafts. 
After years of failing to meet conditions in IMF programs, the Philippines 
met or more than  met  the conditions in  this one. The assiduousness with 
which the Philippines pursued  these targets was in  part due to the limited 
options that the country had; foreign exchange was extremely tight, and the 
release of  funds under both the IMF and commercial bank programs, other 
than for settling arrears, was quite slow and subject to frequent reviews. But 
Philippine adherence to  program  conditions  also  reflected  the  increasing 
domestic opposition to the Marcos regime after the Aquino assassination and 
the need of the government for external support.”  The stabilization program 
as it was carried out represented a tremendous gamble for the regime, as it 
tried  to  simultaneously meet  the  external  conditions  while  protecting  its 
supporters,  forcing  a  greater  burden  of  adjustment  on  the  private, 
nonassociated sector (Montes 1987, 21-27). 
The adjustment program that the Philippines carried out demonstrates the 
power  of  monetary  restraint in  an  economy without institutional inflation 
mechanisms.  The  adjustment  saw  a  tremendous  shift  in  the  noninterest 
current account and the elimination of  both the current account deficit and 
inflation. In contrast to many debtor countries in Latin America, stabilization 
in  the  Philippines  was  rapidly  achieved.  But  the  stabilization  was 
accomplished through reduction in income and a particularly large reduction 
in  investment expenditure,  at  severe cost  to  the  domestic  economy  and 
population.  Little  was  achieved  to  lay  the  foundations for  recovery  and 
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the tradable goods sector.  Despite the large devaluations, the real exchange 
rate  at  the  end  of  1985 was  nearly  unchanged  from its  level  in the  early 
1980s. Beyond the income loss and unemployment,  the severity of the credit 
squeeze traumatized the financial and industrial sectors,  forcing many firms 
under  and  undermining  the  willingness  of  the  banking  system  to take  on 
lending risk,  factors that  would  later delay the recovery  of confidence and 
investment. 
The Aquino Government and 
Prospects for the Economy 
The  “New  Society”  proclaimed  by  Marcos  in  the  early  1970s failed  to 
produce  its  promised  improvements  in  the  welfare  of  Filipinos,  and,  as 
martial  law  continued, opposition to the Marcos  government grew. The oil 
shock and subsequent fall in commodity prices hurt incomes, particularly in 
the  rural  areas.  Although  measured  economic  growth  was  substantial, 
regional income disparities increased, and over the decade the proportion of 
the  population  living  in  poverty  remained  high.’  Continuing  arrests  and 
human  rights violations by  the military brought  protests,  particularly  from 
the Catholic church. 
But the most crucial loss of regime support came in those groups that had 
provided  the  initial  constituency  for martial  law. The patronage  machinery 
on  which  the  political  foundations  of  martial  law  rested,  especially  the 
particularistic interventions and the generation and distribution of  monopoly 
rents,  tended  over time  to narrow  the  base  of  political  support. By  1985 
Marcos’ base was dangerously thin. 
The early support for the government within the rural sector faded as the 
momentum of  land reform dissipated and as military abuses and corruption 
increased.  Even  though  agricultural  terms  of  trade  were  falling,  the 
government  increased  its  taxation  of  important crops through  export  and 
producer  levies  and  through  monopolization  of  trading  and  processing 
activities.  The increasing  incidence  of  rural  poverty  aided the  insurgency, 
and  the  communist  NPA  took  over  effective  administration,  including 
taxation, in several areas. 
Although  the  military  had  been  the  main  beneficiary  of  martial  law, 
opposition within the armed forces developed over promotions and over the 
deployment  of  forces  against  the  Moslem  and  communist  insurgencies. 
Before  1972,  the  Philippine  armed  forces  had  been  small,  relatively 
professional, and reasonably effective. Martial law greatly zxpanded the size 